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TIn this edition of the Journal, an article comparing outcomes in California andNew York State demonstrates that the low-volume programs in California arethe main reason for the disparity in cardiac surgical outcomes between the two
states.1 The report presents results in a way that we are all used to seeing, risk
adjusted with confidence limits, statistical significance, and the like, with primary
and secondary conclusions that make sense. Although everything the authors assert
may be right on the money, we need to use caution in interpreting this kind of report,
because for the California outcomes it relies exclusively on administrative data, and
there lies a slippery slope.
The first problem with using claims data in clinical studies is that it is starting
with an inexact tool. Administrative data are generated by professional coders
who work in hospital medical records departments. Coders are trained to review
charts and identify the diseases and procedures that define the most resource-
intensive diagnosis-related group (DRG) assignment for each hospitalization.
By definition, DRGs encompass similar but not identical patient categories, so
coding does not create exact lists of clinical conditions. Going back to Inter-
national Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes helps, but it
does not solve this fundamental problem. More importantly, diagnosis codes are
not dated in administrative data and do not reliably distinguish between comor-
bidities and procedural complications. For example, diagnoses such as stroke,
atrial fibrillation, and renal failure could either increase the risk of surgery as
comorbid variables or represent postoperative sequelae. This makes for a reli-
able but not very useful risk-adjustment system: bad outcomes obviously do
predict bad outcomes. In addition, hospitals spend variable amounts of time,
energy, and money to make coding better, but their view is toward optimizing
reimbursement, not perfecting clinical accuracy. 3M, the company that brought
us Post-It Notes, takes coding optimization a step further with a product called
DRG Assurance, which helps institutions to improve documentation of revenue-
critical diagnoses and secondarily improves the intensity of coding. Coding
practices therefore vary significantly among institutions. In the final analysis, as
seen through the distorted prism of administrative data, a program like DRG
Assurance that was designed to yield higher institutional payment changes
coding, increases the recorded comorbidity level of an institution’s patients,
increases the complication rate, and reduces risk-adjusted mortality. In reality,
of course, the outcomes have not changed, just the coding.
If administrative data are inaccurate and labile, why does anyone use them for
clinical research? The main reason is because these data are accessible to
everyone and relatively inexpensive to use. In fairness, at times administrative
data may be the only source of information available to look at a clinical
question. In these circumstances, the accuracy caveats have to be prominently
acknowledged and conclusions drawn with a conservative brush, lest we unwit-
tingly validate a growing approach to quality measurement with which we are
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Lunlikely to be happy. That is the second big problem with
administrative data—the increasing tendency to overreach
in its use, especially by those around the fringes of health
care. There has been a virtual explosion of claims-based
health care report cards and measurement systems in the
media and on the Internet. In the past, doctors viewed these
efforts askance but paid them little attention, because they
were being ignored by the public. As administrative data
start to be applied to the design of tiered insurance products,
endorsed by employers and payers as a means for employ-
ees to make “value” decisions, and become a favored ap-
proach to health reform among health benefits consultants
pushing the concept of “transparency,” we can no longer
afford to maintain that indifference.2 Claims data are now
commonly being used to create reports that rank institutions
or providers, with risk adjustment and statistical power
added in a rudimentary fashion to enhance credibility. To
say that the results are imprecise would be an understate-
ment. At the 2004 meeting of the American Association for
Thoracic Surgery, Michael Mack’s group reported a com-
parison of various administrative outcome data sets versus
accurate clinical data reported by their group to the Society
of Thoracic Surgeons. The variation was striking, with as
much as a 46% difference in case volume and as much as a
76% difference in risk-adjusted mortality.3
The study of cardiac surgery results has been a national
pastime for the last three decades, and heart surgeons have
spent a lot of time and resources looking at outcomes. Our
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representatiospecialty has generally excelled under the scrutiny. The
1224 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Junearly and decisive move to a national database by the
Society of Thoracic Surgeons, the groundbreaking quality
improvement work of the Northern New England consor-
tium and widespread and generalizable improvements in
cardiac surgery outcomes have been among the positive
results. There have been many lesson learned, but two stand
out. First, important questions require accurate clinical in-
formation, and administrative data sets don’t make the
grade.4,5 Second, provider-specific profiling, even with
accurate data, can be bad for the public,6 an equally
important but separate topic that is outside the scope of
this editorial.
Figure 1 is a graphic summary created by Gregg Meyer,
former director of the Center for Quality Improvement and
Patient Safety at the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, the federal agency that studies these sorts of ques-
tions. The figure proposes appropriate uses for different
categories of data. Administrative data are cheap and ubiq-
uitous and have value for research, hypothesis generation,
and quality improvement. Use of administrative data for
quality reports to drive pay-for-performance insurance
products is a real problem, because the information can be
so inaccurate, but may be unavoidable because the payers
have these data and will use them anyway. We need to draw
a line, though, when clinical quality measures are intended
to be used by patients for making choices or by the gov-
ernment for shaping important policy decisions. It is then
imperative that the data set have real clinical information as
he purposes of quality measurement.n of tits foundation and be appropriately analyzed and presented.
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LFor cardiothoracic surgery, the solution is to make an au-
dited, compulsory Society of Thoracic Surgeons data set a
national standard. The only defense against misinformation
is authoritative data.
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